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# **Detecting Converted Speech and Natural Speech for anti-Spoofing Attack in Speaker Recognition**

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# Outline

- Motivation
- Voice conversion overview
- Phase feature extraction
- Experiments
- Conclusions

# Motivation


- We would like to detect converted speech (synthetic speech) to prevent spoofing attack against speaker verification system
- Phase artifacts in synthetic speech is an informative cue. We study the ways of phase feature extraction

1. Tomi Kinnunen, Zhizheng Wu, Kong Aik Lee, Filip Sedlak, Eng Siong Chng, Haizhou Li, "Vulnerability of Speaker Verification Systems Against Voice Conversion Spoofing Attacks: the Case of Telephone Speech", ICASSP 2012.

2. Zhizheng Wu, Eng Siong Chng, Haizhou Li, "Speaker verification system against two different voice conversion techniques in spoofing attacks", Technical Report (<http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/home/wuzz/>), 2012.


# Overview of Voice Conversion (1/3)

- GMM-based voice conversion




# Overview of Voice Conversion (2/3)

- Unit-selection based voice conversion



# Overview of Voice Conversion (3/3)

- An analysis-synthesis *pass-through* without transformation



# Phase Artifacts

- Voice conversion techniques focus on spectral conversion
  - Magnitude spectrum contains more information
  - Many vocoders usually use random phase, not the original phase to reconstruct the speech

K.K. Paliwal and L.D. Alsteris, “On the usefulness of STFT phase spectrum in human listening tests,” *Speech Communication*, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 153–170, 2005.

# Phase feature extraction

- Short-time Fourier transform of signal  $x(n)$

$$X(\omega) = |X(\omega)| e^{j\phi(\omega)}$$

$|X(\omega)|$  is the magnitude spectrum


$\phi(\omega)$  is the **phase spectrum**

MFCC

This study




# Cosine Normalized Phase Feature (*Cos-phase*)



Apply discrete cosine function (DCT) and keep 12 coefficients as the feature

# Modified group delay phase (MGD-phase)



# Synthetic speech detector

- GMM-based detector

$$\Lambda(C) = \log p(C|\lambda_{converted}) - \log p(C|\lambda_{natural})$$

$C$  is the feature vector sequence of a speech signal

$\lambda_{converted}$  is GMM model for converted speech

$\lambda_{natural}$  is GMM model for natural speech

We use 512 Gaussian components in this study.

# Experimental setups

- Corpus: a subset of NIST SRE 2006

Training set (number of sessions)	
Natural model	Converted model
100	100

- The duration of each session is 5 minutes
- Three training situations for converted model
  - GMM-based converted speech for training
  - Unit-selection based converted speech for training
  - *Pass-through* speech for training

We will conduct three experiments under the three training situations

# Experimental setups

Testing set (number of sessions)		
Natural	Converted	
	GMM	Unit-selection
1, 500	1, 000	1, 000

- Testing set: in total 3500 sessions.
- Evaluation metric: Equal error rate
  - Natural to converted
  - Converted to natural

# Experimental setups

- Spoofing attack corpus construction
  - SPTK: <http://sp-tk.sourceforge.net/>
    - Analysis: Mel-cepstral analysis
    - Synthesis: MLSA filter

1. Tomi Kinnunen, Zhizheng Wu, Kong Aik Lee, Filip Sedlak, Eng Siong Chng, Haizhou Li, "Vulnerability of Speaker Verification Systems Against Voice Conversion Spoofing Attacks: the Case of Telephone Speech", ICASSP 2012.

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# Results:

- 3 speech models vs 3 features for synthetic speech detection

Feature	EER (%)		
	GMM-based	Unit-selection based	Pass-through
MFCC	16.80	15.35	20.20
cos-phase	6.60	3.93	5.95
MGD-phase	9.13	4.60	2.35

# Conclusions

- Phase artifacts are useful in detecting the synthetic speech
- When transformation technique is *unknown*, we may use analysis-synthesis *pass-through* method to simulate converted data



**Thank you!**